Strategic Management of Partnership Contract for Petroleum Production in the Framework of the twin-model of Behavioral Risks and Inappropriate Choice

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Al-Zahra University

2 Associate Professor, Allameh Tabatabaiee University

3 - Ph.D. candidate for Petroleum & Gas Economy, Allameh Tabatabaiee University, correspodent author

Abstract

The partnership contract for production is one of the methods for attracting foreign investments and development of oilfields. In the same vein, this study aims at estimating the economic possiblity of the mentioned contract in line with the future of the national petroleum industry. Accordingly, the perecentage of optimum economy for partnership contract in oil production is embedded in the framework of the twin-model of Behavioral Risks and Inappropriate Choice. The ourcome of the study indicates that the partnership contracts in production occupy nowhere in the first optimal position of the two models. On the 2nd optimum position and given the particular features of partnership contracts for production and the oil corporations having contract with Iran, it will be found that the contratcs are specified to the 2nd optimum position in the framewok of the two models. In conjunction with the results, it will be proved that the partnership contracts in production are economically optimum; accordingly, the endorsement of such contracts as the suggested fromat of Iran in a bid to conclude exploration, operation and development contratcs in the national sector of oil & gas industry are economically appropritae

Keywords

Interdisciplinary Studies on Strategic Knowledge
Volume 1, Issue 4
June 2018
Pages 105-132

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics